Several recent events have brought national defence into the public debate in Australia ahead of a federal election. These include the continued difficulty with recruiting and retaining sufficient defence force personnel; the controversy with the Chinese warships and its unfriendly activities near Australian waters; and, strong sentiments around America imposing trade tariffs on certain Australian goods. But it is the American president’s unconventional methods of conducting international relations that will compel the next federal government to reassess whether America’s presence in the region and its security assurances provide a reliable basis for Australia’s national defence strategy. There is reason to doubt that a Trumpian America would unequivocally help defend Australia in a war.
In consequence, Australia must become more self-reliant for our national defence while increasingly demonstrating to America that we are a valuable ally worth its commitment to our security. However, a dilemma the government will face in this endeavour is how to build and strengthen our national defences while minimising the rising cost of defence spending on Australian families and to the national economy. We contend that our circumstances present an opportunity, indeed an imperative, for more imaginative thinking about how we can create the wherewithal for our national defence. We believe there is considerable scope for a ‘mixed-purpose’ approach whereby the conventional boundaries between the civil and military domains are removed to support the greater means to defend ourselves.
We outline a few simple examples to illustrate our contention and to stimulate a debate on this topic. The federal government recently announced that it was prepared to acquire Regional Express to avoid its financial collapse. But the government could nationalise the airline as a defence enterprise. The pilots, air and ground crews, engineers etc could mainly be a mix of permanent and reserve defence personnel. The airline could provide passenger and freight services to all major remote and regional Australian communities, improving their access to essential services and markets. The airline could also provide transport for defence personnel and stores, and for their families on remote bases thus reducing their isolation. The resource and other sectors could also be incentivised to use the airline.
The airline could eventually take over national responsibility for emergency aeromedical services, search and rescue, border security, maritime surveillance, aerial firefighting, and other specialised national aviation tasks. The airline would benefit from an expansion of the federal government’s remote airstrip upgrade program. The airline, its facilities, and personnel would also be available for use in civil defence such as national emergencies and in wartime. The cost of operating the airline would be covered by revenue and from other parts of the federal budget. Such an airline would effectively be an auxiliary air force. It would provide new options for government, and increased capability for defence planners if the aircraft types that were operated also had useful military variants.
The federal government announced a pilot program late last year to create a ‘maritime strategic fleet’ to ensure supply of critical resources during national emergencies. The initiative has been criticised. However, the core issues might be removed if this strategic fleet was a defence enterprise. The ships could be captained and principally crewed by a mix of permanent and reserve defence personnel, with a narrower focus on providing support to our, America’s, and other allied countries’ naval operations. But the concept of a strategic fleet could be changed to that of an auxiliary naval fleet, still using defence personnel, which conducted commercial-like activities that supported Australia’s engagement and geostrategic interests in our near regions. This could also reduce some of the pressures on our navy.
The icebreaker operated by the Antarctic Division could become one of several that are used to increase Australia’s presence and activities in Antarctica. The cost of operating these icebreakers could be reduced through supporting America’s and other allied countries’ Antarctic programs. And Australia could have several cruise and cargo ships that supported our Pacific development and engagement programs. This would bring economic benefits to Pacific countries as well as increase our presence and knowledge of the Pacific region. The ships could also be partly crewed by Pacific Islanders to maximise the regional economic benefits. The ships would also be designed to support humanitarian, littoral, and supply operations. The costs of operating these ships would be reduced through the commercial activities.
These examples are part of our broader reimagining of national defence and resilience at a time when it seems prudent to rethink our security from first-principles. This intellectual exercise uses three core propositions. Foremost, that our defence force must be based on an entirely new form of service, where our personnel are neither permanent nor reserve as organised by the current model. We imagine a modern ‘citizen-soldier’ who is attracted to the defence force in part because it offers a mixture of civil and military opportunities, more career options and longevity, and does not isolate the person from the broader civil occupation or profession. We think the defence force would be attractive on these terms, thus increasing its size as well as broadening its skills and experience while contributing to the national economy.
With this, that national mobilisation will not quickly meet the sudden needs of national defence, nor will conscription or requisition be accepted, if the foundations are not already there. Mixed-purpose capabilities and infrastructure must exist, as must a culture of civic-hood and national improvision, and our defence personnel must be as broadly skilled as society. And from these, that we must avoid simply taxing the national economy more to expand our national defence. We need to change our thinking about defence spending as an economic lever to how the national economy can act as the fulcrum for national defence. Our national activities should act as triple levers, by adding to our means of defence, and to our national resilience, thus to strategic deterrence by our preparations showing national resolve.
The federal constitutional powers do provide a broad legal basis for a mixed-purpose approach to national defence, relying solely upon the defence power or else in conjunction with other heads of power like the executive power. The defence power is relatively unique in being a purposive power, with laws tested for their validity by reference to being appropriate and adapted to their subject matter. The case law supports a wide scope of activities which are directly or sufficiently incidental for defence preparations, to protect the nation, in defence, and to return to normalcy. What is important is that the defence power is often described as being ‘elastic’ in its legal character. Thus, what is permissible will expand in response to meet the greater needs for defence preparations and favourable defence conditions within our economic means.
The American defense secretary’s recent statement to European allies should be taken as a clear signal to Australia, when he said that ‘the United States will no longer tolerate an imbalanced relationship which encourages dependency’. Australia must become more self-reliant for our national defence while meaningfully contributing more to collective security. That requires us to become more imaginative with how we respond to our strategic risks, and exploit our strategic advantages, to avoid simply burdening the national economy further. Australia has become conservative in recent decades with its separation of the civil and military domains. We contend that it is imperative that Australia adopt a ‘mixed-purpose’ approach to our sociomilitary affairs, so that ultimately we can remain free, prosperous, and secure as a nation.